Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 9
Issue 3 Spring 2009: Clean Technology and
International Trade

Article 14

The Montreal Protocol Must Act to Prevent Global
Climate Change While Restoring the Ozone Layer
Mark W. Roberts

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Roberts, Mark W. “The Montreal Protocol Must Act to Prevent Global Climate Change While Restoring the Ozone Layer.” Sustainable
Development Law & Policy, Spring 2009, 33-40, 66-67.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

The Montreal Protocol Must Act to
Prevent Global Climate Change While
Restoring the Ozone Layer
by Mark W. Roberts*

Introduction
“Not everything that is faced can be changed. But nothing
can be changed until it is faced.”
—James Baldwin

T

he Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”) has forced the phaseout of more than ninety-five percent of several classes of
chemicals that deplete the ozone layer in developed countries
and approximately fifty to seventy-five percent of these ozone
depleting substances (“ODSs”) in developing countries.1 As a
consequence of these phase-outs, a significant portion of ODSs
that are used as refrigerants and foam-blowing agents are now
being replaced with hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”). Although
HFCs are not ODSs, they are extremely powerful greenhouse
gases (“GHGs”) that exacerbate climate change. Most HFCs
have a global-warming potential (“GWP”)2 hundreds to thousands of times greater than carbon dioxide (“CO2”). The Montreal Protocol must respond to climate impacts of HFCs by
encouraging the use of other energy-efficient ODS substitutes
with low GWP.
A second issue that the Montreal Protocol must address is
that, although existing stockpiles of ODSs have been taken out of
service, ODSs in discarded stockpiles, equipment, and products,
collectively referred to as “Banks,”3 are rapidly emitting powerful GHGs into the atmosphere.4 The emissions from Banks are
delaying the recovery of the ozone layer and exacerbating global
climate change. Banks are currently not regulated by either the
Montreal Protocol or the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). The
Montreal Protocol must take responsibility for the Banks, created by the use and effective phase-out of ODSs, before these
GHGs are emitted to the atmosphere. The International Panel on
Climate Change (“IPCC”) and the Technology and Economic
Assessment Panel (“TEAP”) estimated in 2002 that approximately 21 gigatons (“Gt.”) of CO2 equivalent (“CO2-eq.”) are
contained in Banks.5 Unless action is taken now, the IPCC/
TEAP Special Report predicts that total direct emissions of
CO2-eq. are expected to reach 2.3 Gt. per year by 2015, nullifying
all of the reductions in GHGs achieved under the Kyoto Protocol.6
The history of the Montreal Protocol is one of a dynamic
and evolving treaty that responds quickly to changes in ozone
and climate science, technology, and the needs of industries and
countries dependent on ODSs and their substitutes. Following
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in this tradition, and consistent with the purpose and spirit of
the Montreal Protocol to protect the global environment, decisions should be made to include high-GWP HFCs among the
categories of regulated chemicals and to expand the Montreal
Protocol’s mandate by covering the destruction of Banks. Critically-necessary actions to achieve these goals include:
1. A decision by the Montreal Protocol to add high-GWP
HFCs as controlled substances.
2. A decision by the Montreal Protocol to discourage the production and consumption of high-GWP HFCs and to finance
the incremental costs that developing countries must incur
to avoid using high-GWP HFCs.
3. Expansion of the Montreal Protocol’s activities to include
the management and destruction of Banks worldwide.
4. Coordination with the UNFCCC to: (a) have the phase-out of
high-GWP HFCs serve as a case study for effective technology transfer and funding mechanisms that can be incorporated into post-Kyoto Protocol institutions for other GHGs;
and (b) develop effective funding mechanisms for destroying Banks before they are released to the atmosphere.
The Montreal Protocol and its Parties have repeatedly recognized the need to address the full environmental implications of
their actions.7 Regulation of high-GWP HFCs, a class of chemicals that was commercialized directly due to the phase-out of
ODSs under the Montreal Protocol, and managing and destroying
the Banks of ODSs are the next steps in fulfilling this mandate.

The Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol has been widely touted as the most
successful international environmental treaty to date, having
phased out the production and consumption of the vast majority of ODSs in accordance with set timeframes. The Montreal
Protocol includes the innovative approach of having developed countries (“non-Article 5 countries”) phase out ODSs on
a faster schedule than developing countries (“Article 5 countries”), thereby acknowledging both developed nations’ larger
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contributions to historic emissions and developing nations’
need to provide for their own future economic and environmental development. Additionally, the Montreal Protocol includes
proven mechanisms to assist Article 5 countries in meeting their
ODS reduction goals by facilitating technology transfer and providing financial assistance to ensure compliance and the creation
of necessary infrastructure.
The most basic tenet of the Montreal Protocol is the Parties’
obligation to limit “consumption” and “production” of “controlled
substances.”8 By definition, “controlled substances” include any
substance listed in the annexes to the Montreal Protocol, regardless of whether it exists alone or within a mixture.9 To enable the
Parties to meet their mandate to
restore the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol can add a substance
to the annexes of controlled substances when it is recognized as a
significant ODS.10 Additionally,
the Montreal Protocol permits
Parties independently to regulate substances not included in
the Protocol or undertake more
stringent control measures than
required under the Montreal
Protocol.11
It is important to note that,
while the Montreal Protocol sets
specific timelines for the phaseout of ODSs, it does not specify
the manner in which the phaseout goals are to be achieved.
This flexibility allows Parties
to meet the targets in a manner
best suited to their individual
situations.12 Parties are permitted to utilize materials that have
been stockpiled, produced, or used as a feedstock in the production of other chemicals.13 Moreover, trade in recycled and used
chemicals is not included in the calculation of consumption to
encourage the recycling of materials as a means of satisfying
consumption needs while facilitating phase-out of production.14
Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, entitled Special Section
of Developing Countries, was negotiated to establish a grace
period for compliance with the control provisions to phase out
consumption and production of ODSs ranging between ten and
fifteen years, depending on the chemical, beyond the deadlines
for developed countries.15 Only those nations with an annual
per capita consumption of ODSs of less than 0.3 kilograms per
year can take advantage of the more lenient extended phase-out
schedule.16 Article 5 charges developed nations with the responsibility to provide financial and technological assistance to the
developing nations in the implementation of technologies and
processes with less ozone depleting effects.17
Under Article 10A of the Montreal Protocol, non-Article 5
countries are required to transfer “best available, environmentally

safe substitutes and related technologies” to Article 5 nations at
“fair and most favorable trade conditions.”18 This commitment
to facilitate the access of developing countries to relevant scientific information, data, training, and technology was reasserted
in the Helsinki Declaration adopted at the First Meeting of the
Parties in 1989.19

Financial Mechanism/Multilateral Fund
To address the hesitancy among developing nations to ratify
the Montreal Protocol due to concerns over resources required
for compliance and impacts on their development,20 mechanisms were incorporated into the Montreal Protocol to provide
the financial resources necessary for developing nations to meet
their shared obligations. The
dominant feature of the financial
mechanisms is the Multilateral
Fund for the Implementation of
the Montreal Protocol (“Multilateral Fund”),21 designed to
cover incremental costs incurred
by developing countries as a
result of the phase-out of their
consumption and production of
ODSs.22
Every three years, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
determine the budget for the
Multilateral Fund for a threeyear “triennium,” with contributions from over forty developed
nations based on a United
Nations assessment scale.23 The
Multilateral Fund is managed by
an Executive Committee comprised of seven industrialized
nations and seven developing
countries, which reports annually to the Meeting of the Parties.24
At the 56th Meeting of the Executive Committee in Doha, Qatar
in November 2008, the Executive Committee approved 116 projects and activities for sixty-five countries totaling $57,347,247
plus $9,956,600 support costs for bilateral and implementing
agencies.25
The Multilateral Fund has helped industry in developing countries replace chemicals and equipment and reorganize
production processes, effectively stimulating the redesign of
products.26 The Multilateral Fund has played a pivotal role in
facilitating the transfer of technology and enhancing capacity
building and development capabilities, thereby contributing to
the overall success of the Montreal Protocol.

The Montreal Protocol’s
continued condoning of
the use of high-GWP
HFCs conflicts with its
precautionary and holistic
approach to phasing
out ODSs by creating
altogether different, but no
less dire, environmental
consequences.
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Recognition of the Interplay Between
ODSs and Climate Change
The Montreal Protocol has already significantly benefited
international climate change mitigation. It is estimated that the
phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”) and other ODSs will
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have reduced GHG emissions by 135 Gt. of CO2-eq. between
1990 and 2010.27 Both the text of the Montreal Protocol and subsequent decisions by the Parties make clear that the phase-out
of ODSs should not occur in a vacuum; rather, relevant scientific information and environmental impacts, including climatic
effects, should be considered. The Parties supported this concept
by adopting Decision V/8 in 1993,28 requiring Parties to consider ODS substitutes in light of their environmental impacts.
The following year, the Parties further expanded their mandate
to consider environmental impacts other than ozone depletion
by adopting Decision VI/13.29
That requires the TEAP to “consider how available alternatives
compare with hydrochlorofluorocarbons (“HCFCs”), with
respect to such factors as energy
efficiency, total global warming
impact, potential flammability,
and toxicity.”30
The interplay between the
phase-out of ODSs and climate
change was again explicitly
recognized at the Tenth Meeting of the Parties in 1998 when
forty Parties issued a statement
making it clear that climate
impacts should be considered in
the work of the Montreal Protocol. The Parties stated that there
are “scientific indications that
global warming could delay the
recovery of the ozone layer” and
“environmentally sound alternative substances and technologies
are available for virtually all HCFC applications.”31 The Parties
urged:
all Parties of the Montreal Protocol to consider all ODS
replacement technologies, taking into account their
total global-warming potential, so that use of alternatives with a high contribution to global warming should
be discouraged where other, more environmentally
friendly, safe and technically and economically feasible
alternatives or technologies are available.32
The Montreal Protocol’s contribution to climate change and
the high GWP of many ODSs and their substitutes are widely
recognized.33 As a result, in 2007, the Parties decided to accelerate substantially the phase-out of HCFCs, primarily due their
emissions contribution to global climate change.34 It is estimated that the more rapid phase-out of HCFCs will result in the
following:
• A reduction of potential emissions of HCFCs by approximately forty-seven percent from what would have been
emitted if the accelerated phase-out had not been adopted,
avoiding the emission of nearly one million tons of ODSs; and
• A transition to low-GWP substitutes for HCFCs that are
currently commercially available and under development,

avoiding between 3 and 16 Gt. of CO2-eq. emissions into
the atmosphere.35
The role of the Montreal Protocol in controlling GHGs was
explicitly affirmed in the 2007 G8 Summit Declaration, which
pledged: “We will also endeavor under the Montreal Protocol
to ensure the recovery of the ozone layer by accelerating the
phase-out of HCFCs in a way that supports energy efficiency
and climate change objectives.”36 Following the historic agreement to accelerate the phase-out of HCFCs, the Leaders Meeting
of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate Change
reaffirmed their commitment to
helping the climate by declaring
on July 9, 2008: “[R]ecognizing
the need for urgent action . . .
we commit to . . . actions under
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer for the benefit of the
global climate system.”37 The
explicit focus on climate benefits and energy efficiency, in
addition to ozone benefits, when
assessing the overall impacts
of ODS substitutes and other
strategies adopted by the Montreal Protocol, is consistent with
the Montreal Protocol’s history
of basing actions on sound science and objective technical
assessments.
At the Twentieth Meeting of the Parties in November
2008, the impact on the global climate of ODS substitutes was
recognized in Decisions XX/7 and XX/8, which began the process of evaluating the management and destruction of Banks
and the availability and feasibility of low-GWP alternatives to
ODSs.38

The regulation and
phase-out of high-GWP
HFCs under the Montreal
Protocol would ensure
a more comprehensive
approach by all significant
producers and users
of HFCs on an
equitable basis.
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Preemptive Action Encouraging the Use of
Low-GWP Alternatives to ODSs Will Have
Significant Climate Benefits
The timing is right for the Parties to control the use of highGWP HFCs as ODS substitutes, even if these substitutes are
not ODSs themselves, as the commercialization of high-GWP
HFCs is the direct result of the Montreal Protocol’s phase-out of
ODSs. The UN Conference on Environment and Development
calls on the Parties to “[r]eplace CFCs and other ozone depleting
substances, consistent with the Montreal Protocol, recognizing
that a replacement’s suitability should be evaluated holistically
and not simply on its contribution to solving one atmospheric
or environmental problem.”39 The Montreal Protocol’s continued condoning of the use of high-GWP HFCs conflicts with its
precautionary and holistic approach to phasing out ODSs by creating altogether different, but no less dire, environmental consequences. This is particularly true where substitutes for ODSs
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

with low-GWP, including carbon dioxide (GWP = 1), hydrocarbon and hydrocarbon blends (GWP < 3), and HFC-152a (GWP
= 140) are all technically- and economically-feasible replacements for high-GWP HFCs currently used in both automotive
and stationary air conditioning and refrigeration units.40
The Montreal Protocol has historically regulated refrigerants, foam-blowing agents, aerosols, firefighting chemicals,
specialty medical chemicals, and a limited number of other
chemicals that deplete the ozone layer. As a result, the Parties
have acquired an in-depth understanding of these industries and
the uses of ODSs. HFCs are now being used as replacements for
ODSs in the same sectors41 or are being created as by-products
of the production of these ODSs.42 Therefore, regulating HFCs
would be a logical extension of the Montreal Protocol’s mandate
and consistent with its holistic approach to sectors interacting
with and affected by the phase-out of ODSs.
Decision XX/8, adopted in November 2008, requested that
the TEAP report on the status of alternatives to HCFCs and
HFCs include a description of the various use patterns, costs,
and potential market penetration of alternatives.43 The results of
the TEAP’s investigation are going to be presented at a workshop before the next Open-Ended Working Group Meeting in
Geneva, Switzerland in July 2009.44 The meeting will address
technical and policy issues related to ODS alternatives, with a
particular focus on how the Montreal Protocol can address the
impact of high-GWP HFCs while maximizing the ozone and climate benefits of the early phase-out of HCFCs.45 The UNFCCC
has been invited to participate, as HFCs are within the “basket”
of GHGs being controlled by the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. It is anticipated that the results of the investigation and
workshop will lead to concrete measures to encourage the use of
low-GWP substitutes for ODSs.
Unless the use of high-GWP HFCs is promptly curtailed
globally, their rapid emergence as the primary substitutes for
HCFCs and other ODSs could significantly negate the climate mitigation benefits achieved by the historic phasing-out
of ODSs, offsetting reductions of other GHG emissions under
the Kyoto Protocol. Absent coordinated global action under the
Montreal Protocol in consultation with the UNFCCC, emissions
of ODS substitutes will exacerbate the global climate crisis. The
Montreal Protocol has the technical and funding mechanisms
in place to implement control measures in order to address the
prompt phase-out of high-GWP HFCs and demonstrate how
classes of GHGs within specific sectors can be effectively controlled and eliminated. However, having the phase-out of HFCs
occur under the Montreal Protocol will require substantial international support. The control of HFCs by the Montreal Protocol
would be a model for a UNFCCC sectorial approach to control
of GHGs after 2012. The Parties must act with urgency once
again to strengthen and expand the scope of the Montreal Protocol by amending it to control high-GWP HFCs before their use
and production are widespread and the cost to transition to lowGWP substitutes increases exponentially and becomes potentially prohibitive.
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Emissions From Banks Pose an Immediate
Climate Threat
Emissions from Banks threaten to delay the recovery of the
ozone layer and dramatically impede global efforts to combat
climate change. While the use and production of many ODSs
have been drastically reduced over the past two decades, ODS
Banks still remain in products and machinery throughout the
world. ODSs in Banks are continuously being released to the
atmosphere, either through leakage or when ODSs or products containing them are disposed of at the end of their useful
lives.46 However, the Montreal Protocol defines “consumption”
as imports plus production minus export, thus excluding the
regulation of ODSs in Banks from the Montreal Protocol.47 This
does not include the atmospheric release of ODSs from Banks
and as a result ODSs have not been regulated by the Montreal
Protocol to date. Nonetheless, potential solutions exist to remedy this problem.

Banks Can Be Effectively Maintained and
Destroyed
The mandate for the Montreal Protocol must be immediately
expanded to implement a comprehensive program to address the
maintenance and destruction of Banks. The TEAP has estimated
that the potential cumulative savings if ODSs were recovered
and destroyed across all sectors would be approximately six
billion tons of CO2-eq. between 2011 and 2050, noting that a
sizeable portion of those ODSs would require significant collection efforts.48 To put this into perspective, this large a release
of GHGs would offset all of the gains accomplished under the
Kyoto Protocol.49 If the world’s Banks of ODSs in refrigeration,
stationary air conditioning, and mobile air conditioning (i.e.,
those that are most easily and cost-effectively recovered) were
destroyed, it is estimated that the release of approximately 2.8
Gt. of CO2-eq. would be prevented by 2015.50 As these emissions are already occurring continuously throughout the world,
the gains that could be achieved by preventing these “super”
GHGs from being emitted to the atmosphere are available
immediately.
Approximately forty percent of Banks are installed in the
refrigeration and stationary and mobile air conditioning sectors,
while the remaining sixty percent are in foams, medical aerosols, fire protection, and other sectors.51 Furthermore, Banks are
continuing to increase as the complete phase-out date for ODSs
approach52 and the phase-out of HCFCs is being expedited.
Therefore, Banks will become an increasing problem in the near
future.
The Montreal Protocol and the Parties to it have recognized
the risk to both the ozone layer and global climate from emissions from Banks. As a result, the scope of the problem and the
destruction options and their associated costs have been evaluated for many years.53
In November 2008, at the Twentieth Meeting of the Parties,
the Parties took the first concrete steps to manage and destroy
Banks. In Decision XX/7,54 the Parties agreed to a broad range
of actions to evaluate the management and destruction of Banks,
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including: (1) evaluating ways to mitigate emissions of ODS
from Banks through the Montreal Protocol or by national and/
or regional legislative strategies; (2) authorizing pilot projects to
evaluate collection, transport, storage, and destruction of ODSs
to generate data on how these measures will protect the ozone
layer and achieve climate benefits; and (3) evaluating and adopting best practices and performance standards to prevent emissions from Banks, whether by recovery, recycling, reclamation,
reuse as feedstock, or destruction.55 The Parties also commissioned the TEAP to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of destroying
banks of ODSs versus recycling, reclaiming, and reusing such
substances, taking into consideration the relative economic costs
and environmental benefits to the ozone layer and climate.56
Additionally, recognizing that financial constraints limiting the
ability to manage and destroy Banks are going to be the decisive
factor as to whether emissions from Banks can be effectively
destroyed, the Parties scheduled a meeting of experts from funding institutions, such as the UNFCCC, the Global Environment
Facility, the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism, and the World Bank, to assess possible funding opportunities before the next meeting of the Open-Ended Working
Group.57
Twelve technologies have been approved to date under the
Montreal Protocol for the destruction of CFCs and halons.58 In
developed countries, different technologies are in use for CFC
destruction on a commercial basis. For instance, in Japan, more
than ten technologies were being used in approximately eightytwo ODS destruction plants in operation as of 2006.59 Commercial ODS destruction facilities using technologies approved by
the TEAP are in operation in twenty countries worldwide.60 ICF
estimates that ODS destruction capacities range roughly from
forty to six hundred metric tons per year.61 The cost to destroy
ODS at these facilities varies by country, technology, capacity,
and ODS type. Overall, it was estimated that ODS destruction
costs range between two and thirteen dollars per kilogram, with
an average of about seven dollars per kilogram.62 The pilot studies approved by the Montreal Protocol and a similar study being
undertaken by the World Bank63 are intended to determine what
technologies work best for which ODSs, to identify ODSs that
are actually recoverable, to devise a plan to address ODSs in
Article 5 countries, to ascertain the recovery costs for different
ODSs, and to suggest methodologies for validation and verification of the destruction of ODSs. These findings can then be
incorporated into international carbon off-set regimes.
Tackling the destruction of Banks will require a multi-faceted approach. In non-Article 5 countries, feasible regulatory
approaches include requiring producer/retailers to collect and
destroy ODSs, providing incentives for ODS destruction, and
creating industry-lead programs for this purpose.64 Most nonArticle 5 countries have available infrastructure and facilities
to destroy ODSs effectively in a validated and verifiable manner.65 In Article 5 countries, however, there will be a need for
financial and technology transfers to store and maintain existing
Banks, create destruction facilities, and transport ODSs to existing facilities for destruction, all activities consistent with those
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traditionally occurring through the Multilateral Fund. Infrastructure building and personnel training in these countries will also
be necessary so that the ODS destruction can be validated and
verified.

Funding the Destruction of Banks
To encourage and finance the destruction of Banks in the
short available time frame, funding the Multilateral Fund at traditional levels will not be adequate. One way to generate additional funding would be to tap into the funding from Global
Environment Facility (“GEF”)66 and the carbon trading systems
(e.g., the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), Chicago
Climate Exchange (“CCX”), and Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (“RGGI”)). As of September 2008, the CCX is the
only carbon-trading platform that has an established protocol
for generating credits for the destruction of ODSs.67 The CCX
has developed a protocol to measure and verify GHG emission
reductions resulting from the destruction of ODSs.68
Currently, the destruction of ODSs has not been approved as
an acceptable offset project under the CDM and therefore cannot
generate Certified Emissions Reductions (“CERs”) under the
Kyoto Protocol. Under current CDM rules, however, an international body such as the Montreal Protocol can apply to generate CERs by coordinating a Program of Activities comprised of
numerous CDM programs. By applying and taking control of
ODS destruction programs, the Montreal Protocol could issue
CERs and generate significant funds for the Multilateral Fund
to distribute to Article 5 countries to ensure the expeditious and
controlled destruction of Banks. If the Montreal Protocol takes
on the phase-out of high-GWP HFCs, this could generate revenues not only to fund the phase-out and destruction of Banks
but also of HFCs as well.69
Obtaining funding from the various carbon trading platforms
would result in substantial revenues that could be used to facilitate widespread and rapid Banks destruction. However, allowing
the destruction of ODS Banks into the carbon trading system has
to be structured carefully to maintain the stability of the markets,
ensure that the ODSs destruction results in real climate impact,
and prevent the increased production of ODSs or high-GWP
substitutes simply to profit from the carbon market. Due to the
extremely high GWP of many ODSs, the destruction of small
volumes of ODSs can result in the potential issuance of very
large numbers of CERs. For example, the most common CFCs
in reachable refrigeration and air-conditioning are CFC-11 and
CFC-12 which have GWPs of 5000 and 8500, respectively.70
Therefore, destruction of one ton of these substances would
result in the generation of thousands of CERs. It was estimated
that there were 218,318 tons of CFCs in refrigeration and air
conditioning banks in 2002.71 Destruction of a fraction of these
CFC banks and the resultant issuance of CERs could significantly destabilize the carbon markets and divert funding from
other projects that reduce the emissions of other GHGs or to prevent deforestation. These problems could be avoided by having
the CERs issued for ODS destruction controlled by the Montreal Protocol and having the number of CERs issued correspond
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

to the actual cost of destroying the Banks. By tying the CERs
issued to the actual cost of destruction, the Multilateral Fund
would have the sales proceeds from the CERs to promote quick
and comprehensive Banks destruction. This would not create a
disproportionate number of CERs or destabilize the carbon markets; rather, it would ensure that the CERs issued were directly
tied to the climate benefit achieved.
Destruction of only banned ODS Banks should initially be
eligible for CERs in order to prevent the creation of a perverse
incentive to produce more ODSs with high GWP simply for the
value of the CERs. This problem has already been identified
arising from the production of
HCFC-22 (GWP = 1780 72),
used widely in window unit air
conditioners and small refrigerators, which produce HFC-23
(GWP = 14,31073) as a byproduct. CERs can be earned for the
destruction of HCF-23 through
the CDM. However, as the cost
of destroying HFC-23 is very
low, approximately $0.20 per
ton of CO2-eq.,74 and the price
of CERs is typically between
$5 and $15 per metric ton of
CO2 -eq. reduction,75 huge profits could be made from HFC-23
destruction. It has been calculated that the cost of the direct
installation of equipment to
destroy HFC-23 would only be
$100 million compared to $6
billion worth of CERs that have
been issued.76 The CERs for the
destruction of HFC-23 are sufficiently profitable that industry
observers have suggested that new HCFC-22 production facilities can be financed on the expected profits from the CERs from
the HFC-23 destruction alone.77
Bank destruction can be incorporated into the carbon markets without creating such perverse incentives by limiting the
issuance of CERs to ODSs that are banned. It will be important
to also ensure that funding is available to investigate and prevent
illegal production of banned ODSs given the sizeable profits that
can be made if CERs are given for their destruction.

level by the year 2012.79 The Kyoto Protocol has currently been
ratified by 118 countries, including 32 industrialized countries,
collectively representing only 44.2% of 1990 emissions.80 Conversely, all the major ODS and HFC-producing and consuming
countries have ratified the Montreal Protocol, which has the
ability to impose phase-out requirements on all of these Parties.
Therefore, at this stage, the regulation and phase-out of highGWP HFCs under the Montreal Protocol would ensure a more
comprehensive approach by all significant producers and users
of HFCs on an equitable basis, thereby substantially reducing
the likelihood of illegal trade in
HFCs by creating an even economic playing field as a result of
the global regulation of HFCs.
In international law, successive treaties on the same subject matter are commonplace, as
recognized by the Vienna Convention.81 International law principles allow a treaty that covers
the subject matter of an historic
treaty to be entered into force,
subject to established rules of
interpretation.82 To the extent
the successive treaties are compatible, the provisions of both
treaties are enforceable. When
they are incompatible and where
the subject matter and parties
to the treaties are the same, the
language of the later treaty or the
more specific treaty generally
controls.83
The Parties to the Montreal
Protocol have the expertise to
regulate high-GWP HFCs by
controlling and phasing out their
production and consumption. This is compatible with and complementary to the UNFCCC’s regulation of emissions of HFCs.
The technical expertise, mechanism for technology transfer,
and Multilateral Fund to assist developing countries make the
Montreal Protocol uniquely suited to control and phase out highGWP HFCs. The Montreal Protocol HFC phase-out would act
as a mechanism for developed countries in UNFCCC to achieve
deep emissions cuts and act as a technology transfer mechanism
to help developing countries reduce their GHG emissions in a
measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner. As the UNFCCC
negotiates to extend efforts to control GHGs past 2012, it can
work in collaboration with the Montreal Protocol to use an HFC
phase-out as a tool for Parties to meet strong emissions reduction targets and to ensure that high-GWP HFCs are not needlessly substituted for ODSs in developing countries.
The UNFCCC’s Bali Action Plan84 makes it clear that the
post-2012 climate framework will emphasize technology transfer for developing countries and sectorial emissions reduction

A successful collaborative
effort between the
UNFCCC and Montreal
Protocols could alleviate
some of the tensions
in the current climate
negotiations. The
Montreal Protocol has
demonstrated effective
technology transfer and
funding mechanisms for
developing countries.

Coordination of Regulation of HFCs Under
the Montreal Protocol With the UNFCCC
HFCs are in the “basket” of gases regulated by the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol.78 The current regulation of HFC emissions
under the UNFCCC should not impede complementary regulation under the Montreal Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol requires
industrialized countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol to
cut their GHG emissions by an average of 5.2% from the 1990
Spring 2009
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approaches. Recent submissions by developing countries concerning mechanisms for technology transfers have included
the creation of technology assessment panels and encouraged
capacity building to enable these countries to address GHGs
effectively. These techniques have already been deployed by the
Montreal Protocol; therefore, a phase-out of high-GWP HFCs
under the Montreal Protocol would serve as a model to demonstrate that these techniques can be usefully applied to control
other GHGs.
A successful collaborative
effort between the UNFCCC
and Montreal Protocols could
alleviate some of the tensions in
the current climate negotiations.
The Montreal Protocol has demonstrated effective technology
transfer and funding mechanisms for developing countries.
If applied to HFCs under the
post-Kyoto Protocol regime,
this could build trust between
developed and developing countries within UNFCCC negotiations and instill confidence that
reductions in all GHGs would
occur in an equitable manner, without disproportionately disadvantaging the economies of the developing countries.

of the potential climatic effects of” ODSs and that they were
“[d]etermined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary
measures to control equitably total emissions of [ODSs] . . . on
the basis of developments in scientific knowledge.”88 The text
has to be interpreted in the context of all of the decisions made
and actions taken by the Parties under the Montreal Protocol.89
These actions include all of the decisions cited above,90 where
the climatic effects of ODSs have been recognized and where
the reduction and phase-out of
ODSs have been required to be
viewed in the context of broader
environmental consequences,
including the environmental
impacts of ODS substitutes, and
the latest scientific and technological knowledge. These
actions also include all of the
work performed to evaluate the
non-ozone implications of the
phase-out of ODSs.91
Expand the Montreal Protocol’s Mandate to Control
Management and Destruction
of Banks
Developing countries want
predictable and sustained financing if they are going to be obligated to maintain and destroy Banks. The Montreal Protocol ties
financial assistance to specific goals and projects.92 The Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund is one of the mechanisms that
has created good relations between developed and developing
countries as they have worked to phase out ODSs. By keeping
HFCs within the “basket” of GHGs regulated by the UNFCCC,
funding for the phase-out of high-GWP HFCs under the Montreal Protocol could become available through the funding
mechanisms created by or in conjunction with the UNFCCC to
defray some or all of the costs of the phase-out. Financing from
the funding mechanisms currently being negotiated within the
UNFCCC climate talks, as well as approving the destruction of
ODSs to generate CERs, could create substantial new sources
of funding for the Montreal Protocol to take on this important
work. A phase-out of high-GWP HFCs would again act as a
model to demonstrate the efficacy of certain aspects of its financial mechanisms.

The objectives of the
Montreal Protocol obligate
the Parties to complete the
task of restoring the ozone
layer without exacerbating
the global climate crisis.

Actions Needed to Address High-GWP
HFCs and Banks
Decision to Add HFCs as a Class of Chemicals Regulated
and Phased-Out Under the Montreal Protocol, Including a Pledge
Not to Use High-GWP HFCs Where More Environmentally Suitable Alternative Substances or Technologies Are Available
To date, the Montreal Protocol has only regulated substances that directly deplete the ozone layer. However, the language of the Montreal Protocol does not so limit its authority,
and the Parties should amend the Montreal Protocol to expand
its mission to include combating climate change associated with
ODSs and their substitutes.85 Simple amendments would allow
the Parties to ensure that the phase-out of ODSs is accomplished
without exacerbating climate change.86 The need for the Montreal Protocol to continue its work to find low-GWP substitutes
for ODSs is particularly apparent with the projected massive
increase in the use of high-GWP HFCs as the result of the phaseout of the ODSs. The objectives of the Montreal Protocol will
not be achieved until ODSs have been replaced by substances
with minimal adverse impacts to the global environment.
An amendment of the Montreal Protocol specifically to
combat climate change caused by high-GWP HFCs, even though
they are not ODSs, is consistent with international law principles for treaty interpretation. The first place to look for the intent
and scope of a treaty is the text itself, including the Preamble.87
When the Montreal Protocol was adopted, the Parties included
in the Preamble both the concept that they were “[c]onscious
39

Conclusion
Some of the recent reductions in ODS use have been
achieved by unnecessarily replacing ODSs with high-GWP
HFCs. It is now well-established that high-GWP HFCs are adding to the global climate crisis. Likewise, to date, the Montreal
Protocol has focused on regulation of production and consumption of ODSs and has not regulated the management or destruction of Banks. The objectives of the Montreal Protocol obligate
the Parties to complete the task of restoring the ozone layer
without exacerbating the global climate crisis. The Parties can
accomplish this by: (1) committing not to use high-GWP HFCs
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

as substitutes for ODSs if other more environmentally-suitable
alternative substances or technologies are available; (2) amending the Montreal Protocol to make clear that the protection of the
ozone layer is not going to be accomplished through measures
that exacerbate the global climate crisis by (a) actively phasing
out the production and consumption of high-GWP substitutes
and providing financial incentives for the use of low-GWP substitutes for ODSs, and (b) expanding the mandate of the Montreal Protocol to include the management and destruction of
Banks; and (3) coordinating with the UNFCCC to (a) have the
phase-out of high-GWP HFCs serve as a case study for effective technology transfer and funding mechanisms that can be
incorporated into post-Kyoto institutions for other GHGs and (b)
develop effective funding mechanisms for Banks management
and destruction.

The climate crisis can be effectively combated if it is disaggregated into smaller, manageable components where the
strengths of international, regional, and national organizations
and entities can be brought to bear. The Montreal Protocol has
the unique capacity to regulate and promote the phase-out of
high-GWP HFCs used as ODS substitutes and to manage and
destroy Banks. Both the transition to the use of high-GWP HFCs
and the emissions from Banks are occurring as of the writing of
this article, and the opportunity to control both of these serious
threats to the global environment is time limited. The Montreal
Protocol must be amended promptly to meet these urgent global
challenges.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Jennifer
Bernazani-Ludlum, Heather Spurlock Kennealy, Fionnuala Walravens, and Sean Toohey for their assistance with this paper.

Endnotes: T he Montreal Protocol Must Act to Prevent Global
Climate Change While Restoring the Ozone Later

1

Donald Kaniaru et al., Strengthening the Montreal Protocol: Insurance
Against Abrupt Climate Change, in The Montreal Protocol: Celebrating 20
Years of Environmental Progress 165, 165-66 (Donald Kaniaru ed., 2007).
2 GWP refers to an index that compares the relative potential of GHGs to
contribute to global warming. Many ODSs and HFCs have GWPs in the high
hundreds and even thousands (e.g., HFC-23 has a GWP of 11,700 times greater
than CO2). See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC/TEAP
Special Report: Safeguarding the Ozone Layer and the Global Climate System: Issues Related to Hydrofluorocarbons and Perfluorocarbons 30 (2005)
[hereinafter IPCC/TEAP Special Report], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
special-reports/sroc/sroc_full.pdf.
3 “Banks” is the term used to describe ODSs contained in “existing equipment, chemical stockpiles, foams and other products not yet released into the
atmosphere.” IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 2, at 9.
4 ODSs in Banks are continuously being released to the atmosphere, either
through leakage or when ODSs or products containing them are disposed of at
the end of their useful lives. See Kaniaru, supra note 1, at 174.
5 IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 2, at 9.
6 Id. at 11. The Kyoto Protocol’s emission reduction target is to reduce GHG
emissions by 5.8 percent below a baseline of 18.4 Gt. CO2-eq. between 2008
and 2012, reducing emissions by approximately 1.1 Gt. CO2-eq. per year for
that period, or approximately 4.3 Gt. CO2–eq. See UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Key GHG Data: Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Data for 1990–2003, at 15 (2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
publications/key_ghg.pdf.
7 See, e.g., Eleventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Copenhagen, Beijing, P.R.C., Nov.
29–Dec. 3, 1999, Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Decision XIX/6, UNEP/
OzL.Pro.11/10 (Dec. 17, 1999) [hereinafter Eleventh Report], available at
http://hqweb.unep.org/ozone/Meeting_Documents/mop/11mop/MOP_11.asp
(implementing freeze on production of HCFCs due to the adverse impacts of
that class of chemicals); Nineteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, Can., Sept. 17–21,
2007, Report of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Decision XIX/6, UNEP/OzL.
Pro.19/7 (Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Nineteenth Report], available at http://
ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/mop/19mop/MOP-19-7E.pdf (accelerating the phase-out of hydrochlorofluorocarbons in part due to the GWP of these
substances and their by-products).
8 See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 2,
Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M 1541 (1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol], available
at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/pdf/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.
9 See id., art. 1, para. 4.

Spring 2009

10

See id., art. 2, para. 9.
See id., art. 2, para. 11.
12 See United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], Division of technology, Industry and Economics/GRID-Arendal, Vital Ozone Graphics:
Resource Kit for Journalists 26 (2007), available at http://www.grida.no/
_res/site/file/publications/vitalozone.pdf.
13 See Seventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Vienna, Austria, Dec. 5-7, 1995, Report of the
Seventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Decision VII/30, UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 (Dec. 27,
1995) [hereinafter Seventh Report], available at http://www.unep.org/Ozone/
Meeting_Documents/mop/07mop/MOP_7.asp; see also United Nations Environment Programme, Backgrounder: Basic Facts and Data on the Science
and Politics of Ozone Protection 4 (2008) [hereinafter UNEP Backgrounder],
available at http://ozone.unep.org/Events/ozone_day_2008/press_backgrounder.pdf.
14 See Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Copenhagen, Den., Nov. 23–25, 1992, Report of
the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Decision IV/24, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15 (Nov. 25, 1992)
[hereinafter Fourth Report], available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/4mop_cph.
shtml; see also UNEP Backgrounder, supra note 13, at 4.
15 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, art. 5, paras. 8 bis, 8 ter.
16 See id., art. 5, para. 1.
17 See id. art. 5, paras. 2-3. Additionally, adjustments to the Montreal Protocol permitted developed nations to increase their production of ODSs by a
set percentage specifically to assist developing nations in meeting their basic
domestic needs. See Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, London, Eng., June 27–29, 1990,
Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Annex I, UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3 (June 29,
1990), available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/2mlonfin.shtml. In 1995, the Parties adopted a decision enabling developing countries to export ODSs to other
developing countries. See Seventh Report, supra note 13, at Decision VII/9.
18 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, art. 10A.
19 See First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Helsinki, Fin., May 2–5, 1989, Report of the First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Appendix I (Helsinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer),
UNEP/OzL.Pro.1/5 (May 6, 1989), available at http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/
MP_Handbook/Section_3.8_Annexes_Declarations/Helsinki_Declaration.shtml.
11

Endnotes: The Montreal Protocol Must Act to Prevent Global
Climate Change While Restoring the Ozone Later continued on page 66
40

Endnotes: The Montreal Protocol Must Act to Prevent Global Climate Change continued from page 40
20

See Mostafa K. Tolba et al. Global Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating
Environmental Agreements for the World, in The Montreal Protocol: Celebrating 20 Years of Environmental Progress, supra note 1, at 38.
21 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, art. 10. The mechanism also includes
other forms of multilateral, bilateral, and regional co-operative efforts in compliance with the policies and guidelines of the fund. See Montreal Protocol,
supra note 8, art. 10, para. 2; see also United Nations Environment Programme,
Division of Technology, Industry and Economics, Chemicals Branch, Some
Relevant Aspects of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, http://www.chem.unep.ch/pops/indxhtms/manwg2.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Relevant Aspects].
22 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, art. 10, para. 1. Incremental costs
include such items as the supply of substitute chemicals, conversion of existing
production facilities and plants, capital costs of equipment, training, premature
retirement of equipment, technical assistance, research, and development. See
Fourth Report, supra note 14, at Annex VIII; see also Relevant Aspects, supra
note 21.
23 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, art. 10, paras. 6-7.
24 See Secretariat of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the
Montreal Protocol, About The Multilateral Fund-Overview, http://www.multilateralfund.org/about_the_multilateral_fund.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter Multilateral Fund Overview]; see also Fourth Report, supra note
14, at Annex IX. The day-to-day operations of the fund are managed by a secretariat with a small staff located in Montreal, Canada. See Multilateral Fund
Overview, supra.
25 See Press Release, Secretariat of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, 56th Meeting Approves 116 Projects and Activities for 65 Countries (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.multilateralfund.org/
news/1228514896375.htm. Projects receiving approval included renewal of
institutional strengthening projects in twenty-five countries, projects for the
removal of CFCs from the manufacturing process for metered dose inhalers in
five nations, and approval of a bilateral proposal for an international methyl
bromide compliance workshop for Article 5 countries. Id.
26 See Ralph Luken & Thomas Graf, The Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral
Fund and Sustainable Development, in The Montreal Protocol: Celebrating
20 Years of Environmental Progress, supra note 1, at 71. Central to all Multilateral Fund projects are training programs to enable managers and technicians to
obtain the data and skills necessary to adapt to the new technology. See id. at 72.
27 Donald Kaniaru et al., Appendix 1, Frequently Asked Questions: Strengthening the Montreal Protocol by Accelerating the Phase-Out of HCFCs at the 20th
Anniversary Meeting of the Parties, in The Montreal Protocol: Celebrating
20 Years of Environmental Progress, supra note 1, at 261. Stated another
way, it has been estimated that the phase-out of ODSs under the Montreal
Protocol has resulted in the equivalent of a reduction of 11 Gt. of CO2-eq. per
year—delaying climate change by up to 12 years. Guus J.M. Velders et al.,
The Importance of the Montreal Protocol in Protecting Climate, 104(12) Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 4814, 4817 (2007), available at http://www.pnas.org/
content/104/12/4814.full.pdf.
28 Fifth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Bangkok, Thail., Nov. 17–19, 1993, Report of the
Fifth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Decision V/8, UNEP/OzL.Pro.5/12 (Nov. 19, 1993),
available at http://www.unep.org/OZONE/Meeting_Documents/mop/05mop/
MOP_5.asp.
29 Sixth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nairobi, Kenya, Oct. 6–7, 1994, Report of the Sixth
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Decision VI/13, UNEP/OzL.Pro.6/7 (Oct. 10, 1994) [hereinafter
Sixth Report], available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/Meeting_Documents/
mop/06mop/MOP_6.asp.
30 Id.
31 Tenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Cairo, Egypt, Nov. 23–24, 1998, Report of the Tenth
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Annex 5 (Declaration on Hydrochlorofluorocarbons, Hydrofluorocarbons, and Perfluorocarbons), UNEP/OzL.Pro.10/9 (Dec. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Tenth Report], available at http://www.unep.ch/ozone/pdf/10mop-rpt.pdf.
32 Id.

Spring 2009

33

IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 2, Summary for Policymakers at 3-4.
Nineteenth Report, supra note 7, at 33-34, 38-39, and 44-45 (Decisions
XIX/6, XIX/12, and XIX/20).
35 See Mark W. Roberts, Environmental Investigation Agency, A Climate
Briefing 5 (2008), available at http://www.eia-global.org/PDF/report--Climate
--Jan09.pdf.
36 G8 Summit, Heiligendamm, Ger., June 6–8, 2007, Declaration on Growth
and Responsibility in the World Economy para. 59, available at http://www.g-8.
de/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/2007-06-07-summit-documents.html
(select hyperlink to article).
37 G8 Summit, Hokkaido, Japan, July 7–9, 2008, Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate Change paras. 3, 10,
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/
doc080709_10_en.html.
38 See Twentieth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Doha, Qatar, Nov. 16–20, 2008, Report of the
Twentieth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Twentieth Meeting of the Parties
to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 38-41,
UNEP/OzL.Pro.20/9 (Nov. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Twentieth Report], available
at http://ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/mop/20mop/MOP-20-9E.pdf.
39 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janerio, Braz.,
June 3–14, 1992, Agenda 21, section 9.24(e), available at http://www.un.org/
esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21chapter9.htm.
40 See, e.g., Velders, supra note 27. An example of the high-GWP HFCs to be
replaced is HFC-134a which is commonly used in vehicle air conditioners and
has a GWP of 1300.
41 See European Fluorocarbons Technical Committee, Fluorocarbons and
Sulphur Hexafluoride, http://www.fluorocarbons.org/en/homepage.html (last
visited Apr. 18, 2009).
42 The production of HCFC-22 has increased by hundreds of thousands of
tons per year in the last decade, primarily for use in small air conditioners and
refrigerators. See IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 2, at 11. A by-product
of the production of HCFC-22, also a refrigerant, is HFC-23, a “super” GHG
which has a GWP reported by the UNFCCC to be 11,700 times greater than
CO2. See id., at 30.
43 Twentieth Report, supra note 38, at 40-41 (creating a “[w]orkshop for a
dialog[]on high-global warming potential alternatives for ozone depleting
substances”).
44 See UNEP Provisional Agenda, Open-ended Working Group of the
Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Twenty-ninth meeting, Geneva, (July 15-18, 2009), UNEP/OzL.Pro.WG.1/29/1
[hereinafter Provisional Agenda], available at http://ozone.unep.org/
Meeting_Documents/oewg/29oewg/OEWG-29-1E.pdf.
45 See Provisional Agenda, supra note 44.
46 See Proposed Adjustments to the Montreal Protocol, UNEP/OzL.Pro.
WG.1/28/3/Add.1, available at http://www.unon.org/confss/doc/unep/ozone/
ozL.pro.wg/Pro_WG_1_28/OzL-WG1-28-3-Add1/K0840783_E.doc. citing
TEAP, Response to Decision XVIII/12, Report of the Task Force on HCFC
Issues (with Particular Focus on the Impact of the Clean Development Mechanism) and Emissions Reductions Benefits Arising from Earlier HCFC PhaseOut and Other Practical Measures (August 2007) at 12, available at http://
ozone.unep.org/Assessment_Panels/TEAP/Reports/TEAP_Reports/TEAPTaskForce-HCFC-Aug2007.pdf; see also IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra
note 2, at 53 (“With a typical 20-year lifespan, refrigerator end-of-life retirement and disposal occurs at a frequency of about 5% of the installed base each
year. This means approximately 75 million refrigerators containing 100 [grams]
per unit, or a total of 7500 tonnes of refrigerant, are disposed of annually.”).
47 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, art. 1, para. 6.
48 See generally IPPC/ TEAP Special Report, supra note 2.
49 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
50 See United Nations Environment Programme, Technology and Economic
Assessment Panel, Response to Decision XVIII/12, Report of the Task Force
on HCFC Issues (with Particular Focus on the Impact of Clean Development Mechanism) and Emissions Reductions Benefits Arising from Earlier
HCFC Phase-Out and Other Practical Measures 27 (2007), available at
http://ozone.unep.org/teap/Reports/TEAP_Reports/TEAP-TaskForce-HCFCAug2007.pdf.
34

66

51

IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 2, at 9.
Article 5 countries are expected to completely phase-out the production and
consumption of CFCs, halons, and carbon tetrachloride by 2010. See Backgrounder, UNEP Basic Facts and Data on the Science and Politics of Ozone
Protection (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/pdf/PressBackgrounder.pdf.
53 For examples of decisions relating to Banks destruction, see Fourth Report,
supra note 14, Decision IV/11, para. 7, Decision IV/12, para. 2, and Decision
IV/24, para. 4; Seventh Report, supra note 13, Decision VII/31; Seventeenth
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, Dakar, Sen., Dec. 12-16, 2005, Report Seventeenth Meeting
of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Decision XVII/17 and Decision XVII/18, para. 1, UNEP/OzL.Pro.17/11
(Jan. 25, 2006), available at http://ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/mop/
17mop/17mop-11.e.pdf; and Twentieth Report, supra note 38, Decision XX/7.
54 Twentieth Report, supra note 38, Decision XX/7 (“Environmentally sound
management of banks of ozone-depleting substances.”).
55 Id.
56 Id. para. 7.
57 Id. para. 9.
58 ICF International, Destruction of Ozone-Depleting Substances in the
United States 5 (2008) [hereinafter ICF International Destruction], available at http://www.epa.gov/ozone/title6/downloads/ODSDestruction.pdf (draft
report prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Stratospheric
Protection Division).
59 Ministry of the Environment of Japan, Revised Report of the Study on
ODS Disposal Options in Article 5 Countries 15 (2006), available at http://
www.env.go.jp/en/earth/ozone/ods2006.pdf.
60 See ICF International, Study on the Collection and Treatment of
Unwanted Ozone-Depleting Substances in Article 5 and Non-Article
5 Countries, Final Report 205 (2008) [hereinafter ICF Unwanted ODS],
available at http://ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/oewg/28oewg/ICF_
Study_on-Unwanted_ODS-E.pdf [Report of the Executive Committee of the
Multilateral Fund on case studies called for under decision XVII/17 on environmentally sound destruction of ozone-depleting substances (decision XVIII/9)].
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 The 54th Meeting of Executive Committee approved a 2008–2010 study of
ODSs. See generally Fifty-Fourth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the
Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Montreal,
Que., Can., Apr. 7–11, 2008, The World Bank Business Plan for the Years
2008-2010, UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/54/11 (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://
www.multilateralfund.org/files/54/5411.pdf.
64 See Forty-Eighth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Multilateral
Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Montreal, Que., Can.,
Apr. 3–7, 2008, Report of the Meeting of Experts to Assess the Extent of Current and Future Requirements for the Collection and Disposition of Non-Reusable and Unwanted ODS in Article 5 Countries (Follow Up to Decision 47/52)
at 47, UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/48/42 (Mar. 20. 2006), available at http://www.
multilateralfund.org/files/48/4842.pdf.
65 See ICF Unwanted ODS, supra note 60; see also ICF International
Destruction, supra note 58.
66 GEF projects in climate change help developing countries and economies in
transition to contribute to the overall objective of the UNFCCC. The projects
support measures that minimize climate change damage by reducing the risk, or
the adverse effects, of climate change. See, e.g., Global Environmental Facility,
About the GEF, http://www.gefweb.org/interior_right.aspx?id=50 (last visited
Apr. 18, 2009).
67 Chicago Climate Exchange, CCX Ozone Depleting Substances Destruction Offsets 1 (2008) [hereinafter CCX Offsets], available at http://www.
theccx.com/docs/offsets/Ozone_Depleting _Substance_Protocol.pdf.
68 See ICF Unwanted ODS, supra note 60, at 48. The CCX is unique in
approving a methodology for generating emissions credits for ODS destruction
and is evidence that methodologies for numerous Banks destruction activities
can be established to allow financing opportunities from the diverse institutions
funding projects to combat climate change. See CCX Offsets, supra note 63.
69 See generally ICF Unwanted ODS, supra note 60.
70 CFC-113, CFC-114, and CFC-115 are also commonly used in industrial
uses. U.S. EPA, Ozone Layer Depletion, Ozone Depletion Glossary, http://
www.epa.gov/Ozone/defns.html; U.S. EPA, Ozone Layer Depletion-Alternatives/SNAP, http://www.epa.gov/ozone/snap/refrigerants/.
52

67

71

TEAP, Response to Decision XVIII/12, Report of the Task Force on
HCFC Issues (with Particular Focus on the Impact of the Clean Development
Mechanism) and Emissions Reductions Benefits Arising from Earlier HCFC
Phase-Out and Other Practical Measures (“TEAP Response”), at 27, (August
2007), available at http://ozone.unep.org/teap/Reports/TEAP_Reports/TEAPTaskForce-HCFC-Aug2007.pdf .
72 IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 2, at 8.
73 Id.
74 See IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 2, at 382.
75 Lambert Schneider et al., Implications of the CDM on Other Conventions: The Case of HFC-23 Destruction 10 (2005), available at http://www.
oeko.de/oekodoc/248/2005-006-en.pdf; CDM Executive Board, Report of the
Thirteenth Meeting of the Methodologies Panel 4 (2004), available at http://
cdm.unfccc.int/Panels/meth/Meth13_rep.pdf.
76 Kyoto Protocol ‘Loophole’ Has Cost $6 Billion, New Scientist, Feb. 9,
2007, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11155-kyotoprotocol-loophole-has-cost-6-billion.html.
77 Id.
78 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, at Annex A.
79 Id. at Annex B.
80 UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_
protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
81 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 30, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
82 Id.
83 The overlap of the Parties that have signed and ratified both the Montreal
Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol is almost total. Afghanistan, Chad, the Holy
See, Turkey, the United States, and Zimbabwe are the only Parties to the Montreal Protocol that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The doctrine of lex
specialis favors the more specific treaty.
84 Thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December
2007, Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at
its thirteenth session, Decision 1/CP13, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf.
85 A parallel amendment to the Vienna Convention would be required.
86 An amendment to Article 2F to impose similar restrictions on the use of
HFCs as HCFCs would also confirm the Parties determination to discourage the
use of high-GWP HFCs. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, at art. 2F. Such
an amendment would be consistent with Agenda 21, which calls on the Parties
to “[r]eplace CFCs and other ozone depleting substances, consistent with MP,
recognizing that a replacement’s suitability should be evaluated holistically
and not simply on its contribution to solving one atmospheric or environmental
problem.” See Agenda 21, supra note 39.
87 Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 31(2).
88 See Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, pmbl.
89 Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 31(3).
90 See supra note 4. Moreover the parties tacitly acknowledged the issue of lingering ODSs by including a provision designed to encourage recycling to meet
consumption needs. See Fourth Report, supra note 14.
91 UNEP, Technology and Economic Assessment Panel, Supplement to the
IPCC/TEAP Report (2005), available at http://ozone.unep.org/teap/Reports/
TEAP_Reports/teap-supplement-ippc-teap-report-nov2005.pdf.
92 For example, at its 55th Meeting in July 2008, the Executive Committee
of the Multilateral Fund approved US $36 million, plus support costs, for 169
projects and activities in 108 developing countries to fund the elimination of
over 1,450 tons of substances that harm the earth’s ozone layer. This funding included almost US $16.2 million for 101 countries for the preparation
of plans to address the initial targets set-out in the accelerated timetable for
HCFC phase-out agreed by Parties to the Montreal Protocol in September 2007.
Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the
Montreal Protocol, Report of the 55th Meeting of the Executive Committee of
the Multilateral Fund, UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/55/53/Corr.1 (2008), available
at http://www.multilateralfund.org/files/55/5553.pdf.

Sustainable Development Law & Policy

